D FLIGHT got the call at 0600 that they were to stay home and rest. At the same time, the remainder of the squadron, except for the planning cell, was boarding a single C-130, as were all the maintainers and gun loaders. They took with them all the parts and ammo they needed to deploy and stay in business for the next two weeks. Later that day, as the sun faded beyond the offshore oil rigs in the gulf, D (call sign "Popper") Flight was leveling off at 21,000 feet. Each aircraft in the four-ship formation of A-10s was hauling two laser guided bombs (LGB), two infrared (IR) Maverick missiles, and two cans of cluster bomb units (CBU-87), as well as 1,150 rounds of 30-mm ammo, a Pave Penny laser detector pod, and 480 self-defense flares in the ALE-40 infrared countermeasures system. Two air refuelings later, Popper flight coasted into the objective country.
In the meantime, as Popper Three and Four escorted an AC-130H Spectre gunship into its orbit, Popper Lead and Two, now rid of the LGBs and established in a high-cover orbit, engaged their autopilots and clipped their night vision goggles (NVG) into place. They would now get a slight breather as they conserved fuel and watched Three and Four do their "tag team" act with the Spectre down below. The special forces team, having rescued the hostages, was now pinned down in a firefight. The AC-130 stood off and designated the bunkered command post and barracks with its laser, allowing the two A-10s to demolish the targets with IR Mavericks and LGBS. Three and Four held in a position to cover the gunship as it put down a withering stream of pinpoint fire around the perimeter of the compound.
Just as Popper Three, low on fuel, called "bingo" and commenced the swapout with Lead, Two saw 37-mm tracers coming out of the north gun pit. Lead called the gunship to withdraw while Three rolled in from out of the dark for one last pass to take out the gun pit with CBU-87, but the fuze malfunctioned and the intact cannister hit long. Three and Four then bugged out for the recovery field 100 nautical miles across the border to the southwest. Popper Lead was about to earn his flight pay.
As if the fire hose of tracers weren't enough, an SA-14 surface-to-air missile (SAM) suddenly rose toward Popper Two from near the gun pit. Lead instinctively yelled for flares, and they came out just in time. The threat was getting too hot for the AC-130 to hack the fight in its ultimately predictable orbit, so it offset to the east and called in the A-10s to silence the gun. The special forces team was still pinned down. Popper Lead rolled in from the south to suppress the gun pit, taking advantage of his low altitude safety and targeting enhancement (LASTE) gun solution. He fired a rock-steady 30-mm burst for two and one-half seconds from 9,000 feet away, pumping flares as he pulled off. As Lead's bullets hit their target, Popper Two rolled in from the west for a high 45-degree dive delivery, releasing both cans of CBU-87. The LASTE continuously computed impact point (CCIP) found its mark, and the gun pit was swallowed up this time in a rippling cascade of brilliant, blue white fire. Now back to work.
Popper Lead and his wingman climbed back to their high-cover orbit, clearing the way for the AC-130 tomove back into position. The Spectre crew could sense the urgency in the special forces team leader's voice over the secure FM radio net. The guerrilla troops had closed to within 25 meters of the friendly position on the southeast side of the compound, and the team was taking heavy automatic weapons fire. But the gunship's sensors were already trained on the enemy location. Seconds later, the staccato report of the guerrillas' AK-47s was drowned out by a precise hail of 20-mm fire from the AC-130.
The special forces team was already hurrying to the pickup point when Popper Lead heard Hitman Flight's two-ship formation of A-10s checking in with the inbound Pave Low III MH-53J helicopters. Popper Two had just called bingo minus one, so Lead started a maximum-range climb cruise toward the recovery base as he briefed Hitman on the swapout. Hitman's task was to join with the gunship to protect the helicopters during the crucial pickup and exfiltration of the special forces team and rescued hostages to friendly territory.
Twenty minutes later as Popper approached the recovery strip (across the border in a neighboring country), he and his wingman went to 100-percent oxygen. They'd had a long night, and it wasn't over yet-they would have to land on the narrow 4,000-foot strip. The short-field training at all those Army forts in the States was about to payoff, Popper Lead thought, as he set his HUD flight-path marker just short of the runway and slowed to minimum-run landing airspeed. Both aircraft stopped within 2,000 feet. When they finally shut down and went to the intelligence tent for debriefing, the operations officer told them the latest news. Their mission had been successful, but resistance at some of the other objectives had been much stiffer than predicted. When the sun came up, the operation was likely to continue for at least several more hours, if not days. For now, they and their A-10s were the only show in town. Furthermore, he said that the squadron was already being tasked for a wide variety of missions, such as escort for helicopter and fixed-wing airlift, combat search and rescue (CSAR), hunter-killer suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) operations with AC-130s, interdiction, antihelicopter operations, and emergency close air support (CAS), if necessary. The operations officer went on to say that what had started out strictly as a special operation was quickly evolving into a classic low-intensity conflict (LIC). It looked like this was going to be a Hog war if ever there was one.
This hypothetical scenario could very well occur in contingency operations of short duration involving both special and conventional forces--the type of armed conflict in which the United States is most likely to find itself in the foreseeable future. James R. Locher III, assistant secretary of defense for special operations and LIC, remarked that "as we enter the 1990s, Third World instability looms as a global problem, creating threats of terrorism, insurgency, regional warfare, violence engendered by narcotics trafficking and other forms of unconventional conflict."1 Indeed, the secretary predicted that the budget for special operations to confront these threats will increase roughly 6 to 8 percent each year over the next five years, despite projections that overall spending on defense will decrease during the same, time period.2
The A-10 is a near-perfect aircraft for combatting such third-world conflicts. No other aircraft in the US inventory could successfully fly the entire sortie described above. I do not claim that the A-10 is better suited for delivering LGBs than an F-111 equipped with Pave Tack or that it is a better interdiction platform than an F-15E or F-16. The A-10 can, however, deliver precision standoff weapons to suppress defenses or destroy hardened targets. Additionally, it can loiter for long periods of time to support an AC-130 gunship; provide emergency surgical CAS for engaged troops; escort airlifters to protect them from hand-held SAMs and anti aircraft fire; recover to a short, unimproved airstrip; and conduct virtually selfsustained operations out of that airstrip for weeks, if necessary. The A-10 stands alone in its ability to perform all of these missions and more. The current and future capabilities of the A-10 could make it pivotal to the success of future special operations and low-intensity conflict (SOLIC) missions.
Force Survival
The proliferation of infrared SAMs throughout the third world means that aircraft designed for special operations and conventional airlift are more likely than ever to encounter these threats, as well asfire from heavy caliber antiaircraft artillery (AAA). A-l0s employed in an escort role would greatly enhance the survivability of conventional fixed-wing airlifters and helicopters. That is, A-10s can employ as a dedicated escort to the force, fly ahead to sanitize ingress/egress routes, or perform landing-zone preparation as required. With its heavy external-load capacity and GAU-8 30-mm cannon, the A-10 can use decisive ordnance to eliminate threats or draw fire ahead of the force and steer it clear. Moreover, the A-10's relatively slow airspeed makes it uniquely capable of escorting even slow helicopters. These escort tactics might normally be counterproductive for special operations aircraft in some purely covert scenarios, where additional aircraft would risk highlighting or exposing the mission. However, in situations requiring a forces entry or on "Day Three," where a special operation has evolved into a broader conflict, an armed A-10 escort could prove crucial to force survival and mission success.
This concept is not new. A-10 pilots have flown airlift escort for years, having inherited it from the A-1 drivers. The A-10's infrared countermeasures (IRCM), though, are new. The 480-flare ALE-40 system currently installed on the A-10 can give airlifters an effective, sustained IR screen against hand-held IR SAMs for long periods of time-whether en route, during an airdrop or a pickup, over a target, or during takeoff and landing. In fact, the A-10 can put out a flare every three seconds for 24 minutes!3 In addition, it can engage AAA threats and destroy them with a variety of standoff weapons: IR and electro-optical AGM-65 Mavericks, cluster munitions, LGBs, and the GAU-8 30-mm cannon. The new LASTE system (already purchased and being fielded) will allow A-10 pilots not only to improve their capability to safely employ low-altitude terrain masking, but also to deliver even free-fall munitions with pinpoint accuracy from high, standoff altitudes. Further, the system allows precise employment of the aircraft's gun at ranges as great as two nautical miles.4 Thus, the A-10's maneuverability, firepower, and IRCM suite make it an excellent platform for supporting airlift and helicopters in the SEAD/escort role.
A-10s employed in the SEAD mission offer immense support to AC-130 gunships. Confined to a circular, predictable orbit, the gunships are vulnerable to medium-caliber AAA such as 23-mm and 37-mm guns. (Actually, the AC-130s are less vulnerable to the guns they know about and can target with their onboard weapons than to the unknown guns outside their orbit that can take unobserved "belly" shots.) When A-10s are in a highcover "stinger" orbit above them, the gunships have at their disposal immediate, reactive firepower from long, standoff ranges to take out these threats. If the threats around the target itself are too "hot," the AC-130 can stand off and, if necessary, designate the enemy weapons with its laser, so the A-10s can come in and take them down. Once the threat is knocked out, the Spectre can move back in and survive. This tag-team concept is not merely hypothetical. Tactical Air Command (TAC) successfully directed a test of these tactics in 1987,5 and, since then, operational A-10 units have employed them in training with AC-130s.
Last, the advent of armed helicopters in the 1990s posesa new threat to the AC-130 in a target area, particularly if the scenario forces the gunship to operate during daylight. But the A-10, now armed with AIM-9M air-to-air missiles, is well equipped to defend itself, the AC-130, and other assets against helicopter threats.
Firepower
In addition to providing a dedicated and potent defense against potential threats, the A-10's firepower complements the current (and even future) AC-130 weapons suite by offering an effective, proven capability to destroy hard targets. The AC-130 cannot destroy bunkers, hardened fuel-supply areas, ammunition storage areas, bridges, heavy tanks, and fortified buildings, but the gunship's versatile sensors can pinpoint and designate such targets, allowing the A-10 to take them out quickly and economically. In essence, the AC-130 acts as a forward air controller (FAC), marking the target with gunfire and/or laser, while the A-10 rolls in for the kill with the appropriate munitions: LGBS, free-fall bombs, Maverick missiles, Rockeye CBUS, combined effects munitions, or 30-mm munitions, as required. The advent of LASTE-equipped A-10s will make the AC-130/A-10 hunter-killer combination even more formidable.
In situations where collateral damage must be kept to a minimum and where AAA/IR SAM threats create an unacceptable risk for the AC-130, the gunship again can stand off to acquire and designate for the constantly maneuvering A-10 while it employs its 30-mm cannon. The A-10 can orbit high above the threat envelope and then roll in to strafe from high dive angles to reduce ricochets and minimize the weapon-impact "footprint." Loading the A-10's cannon only with target practice rounds will reduce collateral damage even further (since no rounds explode) but still produce effective firepower against troops and trucks.
The ultimate result of employing A-10s in concert with AC-130s isa force package whose weapons effectiveness, mutual support, and survivability are greatly enhanced. (Such benefits are also evident in the joint air attack team--JAAT--concept, whereby fixed-wing CAS aircraft integrate in the target area with attack helicopters.) Furthermore, the A-10's slow airspeed, maneuverability, range, and loiter time make it eminently suitable to work with the AC-130s, whether the mission is special operations, CAS interdiction, or armed reconnaissance.
Operational Flexibility
Like other fighter aircraft in the US inventory, the A-10 is air refuelable and capable of rapid deployment worldwide on very short notice. However, unlike many other aircraft, the A-10 requires a very small logistics support package. A single C-130 can put six A-10s, maintenance troops, tools, support equipment, and spare parts "in country" for four weeks. As any A-10 crew chief or specialist will confirm, the Hog is simple, reliable, and easy to maintain, even under austere field conditions. While I was assigned to the 74th Tactical Fighter Squadron at England AFB, Louisiana, we deployed to a bare base in the Central American region in 1987 with six A-10s and only those parts we could carry on one C-130. We flew a total of 509 sorties with those same six jets in 44 flying days.
The ruggedness of the A-10 airframe is legendary. The A-10's systems redundancy and "hardness" allow it to withstand battle damage that would cripple any other aircraft. Although operations during an intense war in Europe would require the Hog to fly into the heart of the threat envelope (and spend a lot of time there), in a lesser conflict the A-10 could stand off above and beyond the threat much of the time and avoid getting hit in the first place.
The A-10 can also operate from unimproved runways inaccessible to other fighters. Foreign object damage, insufficient runway length, lack of arresting cables, or unavailability of other supportequipment do not deter the Hog. A-10s routinely deploy to short Army airfields and have even operated from dry lake beds, taking fuel and ammunition from a C-130 equipped with fuel bladders and 30-mm automatic loading systems. This ability--together with its maintenance turnaround time, payload, range, and loiter time--makes the A-10 ideally suited for the bare-base operations likely to be required in many contingency or covert operations.
In addition to the missions already discussed, the A-10 demonstrated during the TAC testing of 1987 that it could resupply special forces teams in remote locations. In that test, A-10s loaded with supply containers paradropped them to ground forces in the field.6
Furthermore, the fact that the A-10 has a low political profile is a subtle, yet important, attribute that should make the aircraft attractive to special operations and LIC planners. It is "low tech," can't carry nukes, and is quiet (ever hear two A-10s fly overhead at 10,000 feet?). As mentioned, it can operate at out-of-the-way forward bases and is fully combat capable (thanks to the GAU-8), despite the fact that no bombs hang on the wings for TV camera crews to film. When a distinctly American show of force is necessary, however, the A-10 is ideally suited to this task because it is unique to the US inventory.
Last, in an era ofshrinking defense budgets, single-mission aircraft may no longer be affordable. Although a war in central Europe would find the A-10 performing close air support exclusively, LIC opens up an entirely new spectrum of viable A-10 missions. Not only can it perform CAS, but also it can support special operations by flying armed reconnaissance, interdiction, SEAD, CSAR, FAC, antihelicopter operations, resupply, and fixed-wing/ helicopter escort missions. Inthe LIC environment, then, the A-10 is truly a multimission airplane, and it is bought and paid for.
Night Capability
Speaking strictly in terms of current aircraft capabilities, the concern most often voiced in discussions about an expanded role for the A-10 in special operations and LIC is its alleged lack of any night capability whatsoever. In point of fact, however, A-10s have conducted reduced-threat CAS training at night for as long as the airplane has been in existence. Admittedly, though, in order to acquire targets at night, the A-10 must rely either on illumination/marking devices--airborne flares, "logs" (ground-illumination markers), or artillery-marking rounds (e.g., 40-mm misch metal or 105-mm white phosphorus [WP])--or on the target-cueing ability of the Pave Penny laser detector.
Illumination flares work well but don't last long and can highlight the employing aircraft. Worse, they can easily give away the position of a covert mission; thus, they may often be unsuitable for special operations. Logs don't give away the employing aircraft, and they allow an adequate aiming reference on the ground, but they are hard to see and difficult to place accurately. The 40-mm misch-metal rounds fired by the AC-130 can be used to "sparkle" the target, marking it for A-10 acquisition. The 105-mm WP rounds can be used in conjunction with a laser spot to identify the target. For example, the gunship puts down a WP round to point the A-10 toward the general vicinity of the target. The A-130 (or ground/helicopter laser team) then lasers the target, and the A-10's Pave Penny acquires the laser spot. The pilot places the Maverick boresight over the Pave Penny diamond in the heads up display and thus acquires the target.
Of all these target acquisition/cueing methods, the Pave Penny is currently the most accurate, compatible system for the A-10 in night employment. This system detects the laser and presents a cue in the HUD that overlays the target. The A-10 pilot can use that cue to aim the aircraft's gun, iron bombs, or Maverick missiles. In fact, when employed with the Pave Penny, the IR Maverick gives the A-10 an excellent nighttime standoff weapon for destroying hard targets up to several miles away.7
Perhaps the least known, yet most dramatic, capability of the Pave Penny-equipped A-10 is its ability to deliver LGBs from high-altitude, level flight (or from a conventional dive). The A-10's Pave Penny/LGB combination actually makes the Hog a "smart" delivery platform, allowing it to drop 500- or 2,000-pound bombs from high altitudes with pinpoint accuracy, without ever pointing at the ground. In a special operations/LIC context, this system could be especially effective in covert interdiction and strikes against hard targets.
Although the A-10 can indeed work at night, it currently has no night vision capability. Pave Penny gives A-10 pilots a good target cue, but they still cannot see the target except under flares or in the IR Maverick video display. For delivering LGBS, IR Mavericks, or bullets in an interdiction or SEAD scenario, the Pave Penny alone might suffice, as testing has shown.8 But if the aircraft is to provide truly effective CAS for troops in contact, as well as escort and night CSAR, it must have an effective night vision device. There is no substitute for the situational awareness gained by being able to see what is going on in battle. Furthermore, this asset would simplify coordination with the other players, especially in terms of radio communications. This benefit was graphically demonstrated in Operation Just Cause, which employed night vision devices extensively.9
Only in recent years have suitable night vision systems or devices become available for fighter aircraft. The low-altitude navigation and targeting infrared for night (LANTIRN) navigation pod currently employed by the F-15E and some F-16Cs is ideal for strike, interdiction, and battlefield air interdiction (BAI) missions. It may also prove viable for the air support role envisioned for the A-16 follow-on CAS aircraft. However, for A-10s supporting the unique spectrum of special operations/LIC missions, a forward looking infrared radar (FLIR)--for example, LANTIRN, Pathfinder, or LANA (low-altitude night attack)--alone would be unsuitable for two reasons. First, it would require very expensive modifications to the aircraft. Second, in terms of mission requirements, it is incompatible with the fluid nature of many of the missions discussed here. A-10 pilots must be able to took around in all directions to see the helicopters they are escorting, to deconflict with the gunship, or to see the target and friendlies and then plan the roll-in accordingly. By itself, visual information from the FLIR in the HUD would just not suffice in many cases.
The ideal system would be aheadsteerable FLIR/low-light-level television integrated in the pilot's helmet (e.g., the Falcon Eye system used in the A-16 CAS demonstrator). A simple turn of thehead would allow the pilot to see at night in almost any direction, thus providing the needed employment flexibility and situational awareness. Once again, however, because such a system would require extensive modifications to the aircraft, it would probably be too costly.
Helmet-mounted night vision goggles utilizing low-light intensifiers offer another alternative. They allow the pilot to "look around" in any direction, and theyare about one-tenth as expensive as the FLIR options.10 However, NVGs have had serious drawbacks in the past. Originally designed for surface forces and subsequently modified for airlift and helicopters, they were very cumbersome and limited both the field of view and visual acuity. Furthermore, NVGs were simply incompatible with fighter aircraft because they were not stressed for high-G loading and were not safe to wear in an ejection. However, NVGs now in production resolve or minimize these problems and are specifically designed for fighter aircraft. They offer a wide field of view and improved visual acuity; are lightweight, streamlined (fitting underneath the visor), safe for ejection, and stressed for high-G loads; furthermore, they adapt to the current-issue helmet and clip on and off like an oxygen mask. These NVGs require no aircraft modifications other than those to cockpit lighting. However, cockpit lighting has improved to the point that these modifications are simple, cheap, and quick (taking no more than one day). The total cost is well under $40,000 per aircraft.11 This new generation of NVGs can provide the A-10 with a simple, cost-effective night vision capability that would allow the aircraft to support special operations and LIC missions 24 hours a day.
Conclusion
Clearly, the A-10 can support US forces on the low-intensity battlefield. Furthermore, the addition of a simple, effective night vision system would substantially improve the quality of that support. Toward that end, Tactical Air Command is conducting an A/OA-10 technology demonstration program to examine the integration of various FLIR options with LASTE, as well as various NVG options and other systems improvements. We need to take this technology demonstration one step further, however. TAC should conduct a follow-on tactics development and evaluation with joint special operations forces to evaluate how well an A-10 equipped with LASTE, NVGS, and/or FLIR can support these forces in a broad range of missions. In the meantime, the tactics and techniques verified by TAC's 1987 test, mentioned previously, have been incorporated into the A-10 tactics volume of Multicommand Manual (MCM) 3-1, Tactical Employment.12 A-10 units should train with these tactics in joint exercises.
LIC is the real war facing the United States today. In the A-10, the Air Force possesses a low-cost, multimission aircraft of unequalled versatility. When measured by the vital enhancements it will offer to force survival, firepower, and operational flexibility in low-intensity conflicts, the A-10 stands alone. It is uniquely suited to fight in this environment.
Notes
1. Barbara Starr, "Crucial Role for US Special Forces," Jane's Defence Weekly, 16 December 1989, 1335.
2. "Growing Role for SOLIC," Jane's Defence Weekly, 12 May 1990, 915.
3. TO 1A-10A-34-1-1, Non-nuclear Weapons Delivery Manual, 1 June 1984, 1-56.
4. Mike Spick, A-10 Thunderbolt II (London: Ian Allan Ltd., 1987), 87.
5. See Capt Scott A. Reynolds, A-10 Special Operation Support Tactics Development and Evaluation Final Report (U), TAC Project no. 87W-003F (Nellis AFB, Nev.: Tactical Air Command, February 1988). (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.
6. Ibid., 16 (information extracted is unclassified).
7. Spick 33.
8. Reynolds, 38 (information extracted is unclassified).
9. Maj Harold Tiahrt II, 1st Special Operations Wing/DOX, Hurlburt Field, Fla., interview with author during Air Force Special Operations Command Tactics Conference, Hulburt Field, Fla., 27 March 1990.
10. Capt Mark Ronco, A-10 Technology Demonstrator Program project manager, 57th Fighter Weapons Wing/DT, Nellis AFB, Nev., interview with author, 10 October 1990.
11. Larry G. Hoppe, Night Vision Corp., Hurlbert Field, Fla., interview with author, 28 March 1990.
12. MCM 3-1, Tactical Employment (U), 1 May 1990. (Secret) No information is extracted.
Capt Robert H. Brown (BA, Wake Forest University) is the officer in charge of the Fighter Weapons Review at the USAF Fighter Weapons School (FWS), Nellis AFB, Nevada, and also serves as a flying and academic instructor at the FWS. Previously, he served as an A-10 instructor pilot, standardization and evaluation flight examiner, and squadron weapons officer with the 23d Tactical Fighter Wing, England AFB, Louisiana. While assigned to England AFB, he received the Risner Award as the outstanding FWS graduate in the tactical air force for 1986. Captain Brown is a graduate of the USA Fighter Weapons School and Squadron Officer School.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
Published Airpower Journal - Winter 1990